Defining Democracy Assistance

The following is an email exchange between myself and Richard Lappin, one of the foremost authors on the subject of how to define democracy assistance. I want to thank him for providing a thorough response to the questions I raised. (He quotes the questions in his responses, but I would be happy to forward the full exchange to any interested parties.)

William Mosley-Jensen

Email Text:

Dear William,

My thanks once again for contacting me in regard to your work towards defining democracy assistance more clearly. Such efforts are never easy and I wish you all the very best with this and the intercollegiate policy debate.

To respond to the questions you raised:

1.) You distinguish democracy assistance from positive political conditionality, does this mean that democracy assistance is always offered unconditionally, with no quid pro quo attached to the offer?

In my article I stressed the importance of distinguishing between democracy assistance (a specific strand) and democracy promotion (a wider objective). While such a distinction is revealing and theoretically important, the 'messy' reality of international relations makes such a separation unlikely in most contexts.

Although many would wish that democracy assistance is always offered unconditionally, the most significant democracy assistance efforts usually tie into broader strategic issues. This is particularly true of the US approach, which sees democracy promotion (and by virtue democracy assistance programmes) as a means not only of improving a foreign country's political system, but also securing peace at home. To quote Bill Clinton, 'ultimately the best strategy to ensure our security and to build a durable peace is to support the advance of democracy everywhere.'

However, Clinton's use of 'everywhere' is perhaps misleading. Democracy is not promoted (or assisted) consistently throughout the world. One only needs look at the difference in approach from China and Egypt (until very recently) to the Balkans and Liberia (and not to mention Iraq and Afghanistan). To some extent though, a nuanced approach is understandable. There is an argument that aid should be focused on those countries where breakthroughs are most likely (so as not to avoid wasted resources, as well as ruin expectations among the target citizens), that efforts to democratise are genuine and the political will exists (so as not to support pseudo-democracies and entrench autocrats), and that international assistance is seen favourably (so as to avoid charges of imperialism and damage to international relations).

As mentioned, international relations are 'messy'. And foreign policy objectives are not always complementary but can be conflictual. Democracy assistance will (and perhaps, should) never be the central organising principle for foreign relations. And here I direct you to the last paragraph in the sub-section on the Inherent Limitations of DA in the article. That said, democracy assistance remains a critical strategy, within the right context. Special attention must be paid to how democracy assistance (and promotion) is talked about by governments and agencies. Its limitations should be noted, its principles and standards (if not its application) should be approached more consistently, and its benefits spoken of in more modest terms. I believe the US approach is changing under Obama and I would point you to a short opinion piece I wrote: http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/resources/ethics_online/0042.html

Also of interest, is the impact that negative assessments of democratization (such as election observation reports) have on funding (conditionality). Donors make significant use of election observation reports as a means for measuring democratic progress and, consequently, determining an appropriate aid package for that country. Although the perception that observation reports act as a rubber-stamping mechanism for the release of aid packages is too crude, it is true that countries demonstrating democratic progress do receive increased aid. The inverse relationship is also perceptible, with Crawford documenting several cases of aid withdrawal by donors when a country is deemed to be acting in a non-democratic manner. Moreover, the threat of aid withdrawal may be used as a further deterrent against possible electoral irregularities. I would suggest the following articles in this regard:

Alberto Alesina and David Dollar, "Who Gives Foreign Aid to Whom and Why?," Journal of Economic Growth 5, no. 1 (2000), 33-63.

Gordon Crawford, Foreign Aid and Political Reform: A Comparative Analysis of Democracy Assistance and Political Conditionality (New York: Palgrave, 2001).

2.) Does the 'booster' to internal groups already working towards democratization ever come with provisions attached on how the aid is to be used, the political projects that they can undertake, or the political parties that they can support?

The short answer is yes, and increasingly so; but it is important to find the balance. Internal groups must be the driver of democratic change. They are naturally more aware of the political context and, being their country, they have the biggest stake in the successful and peaceful outcome of any democratization efforts. They must believe in the project and have the necessary skills. Put simply, if they do not 'own' the transition, it will be unlikely to succeed. In contrast, international assistance rightly should impose some conditions. The assistance comes from taxes and the money spent, like all public money, should be accountable and evaluated by parliament. International groups arguably have their own security interests to consider (again blurring democracy assistance with other foreign policy aims, and security for the donor country may be considered to trump the democratization of the recipient country). The experience that donor countries have in assisting countries should not be discounted too. They have been through similar processes in several countries previously and their comparative experiences can help identify possible problems and solutions which domestic actors may be blinded to.

That said, the role of donor groups has to be flexible. There is a tendency to over-evaluate. Many donor groups can be bogged down with reporting to donors rather than working towards democratization. There is also the dilemma of how to measure qualitative change and often the short-term, quantitative conditions imposed do not correspond to the long-term, qualitative changes of democratization. Here I would direct you to my article on evaluation of democracy assistance at: http://issuu.com/njia/docs/njia_winter2010

As for other relevant literature, the key articles for me are in the bibliographies of my articles. I would therefore, suggest a quick look at the references in the following:

·          ‘The Unique Challenges of Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance’ Peace Review, Vol.22, No.2, (2010): 178-183

·         ‘What We Talk About When We Talk About Democracy Assistance: The Problem of Definition in Post-Conflict Approaches to Democratisation’ Central European Journal of International & Security Studies, Vol.4, No.1, May (2010): 183-197

·         ‘Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance: A State of the Art’, Cahiers of the Centre for Peace Research & Strategic Studies, No.85 (2010): 1-123

·         ‘Evaluating Post-Conflict Democracy Assistance: An Exercise in Applied Political Development’ Northwestern Journal of International Affairs, Vol.10, No.2, Winter/Spring (2010): 31-47

·         ‘Obama and Democracy Assistance: Challenges and Responses’ Carnegie Ethics Online, February (2010)

·          ‘Post-Conflict  Democracy Assistance and the Capability-Expectation Gap’ in Peace, Conflict and Identity: Multidisciplinary Approaches to Research, eds. R. C. Hudson, W. Benedek and F. Ferrandiz, Deusto: HumanitarianNet (2009): Ch.8: 149-178

I hope the above helps. I have just returned from a series of lengthy duty travels and I'm not quite sure where my head is right now. If you do have any further questions or clarifications, please do contact me. I would also be interested in how the debates pan out and of any conclusions or papers which follow.

Wishing you all the best in your endeavours,

Richard